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Synopsis  
 
This article describes the findings from research conducted in the UK into the 
social-psychological factors influencing the sharing of Cyber threat information.  
 
Analysis of detailed interviews with a rich variety of security professionals, spread 
over one year, yielded insights into both the influences and the mental processes 
involved. Trust, ability, empowerment and professional confidence are key 
factors. In addition, the influence of expectations, reputation and perceptions of 
others were fundamental to the impact of key factors. Interestingly, the dominant 
‘frame of mind’, or ‘Social Identity’ altered the ultimate decision making. These 
findings offer potential for the development of practical techniques for nurturing 
the sharing of sensitive information between organisations. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This report is a synopsis of an MSc paper prepared by  
Messenger Associates in conjunction with NISCC.   
It forms the basis of continuing work within NISCC on  
the role of trust in information sharing. 
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1.0 The situation 
  
There are known benefits from both public and private sectors sharing 
information about cyber-security threats and vulnerabilities. The aim is to mitigate 
the detrimental impact of cyber-security threats for both the victim organisation 
and to protect the nation’s critical infrastructure. Yet initially, sharing might seem 
an altruistic act; however organisational benefits are measurable. Economistsi in 
the US have taken a hard and rational look at the value of sharing within cyber-
security and conclude clear benefits; particularly in competitive market places 
were products are interchangeable.  
 
The importance of cyber-security is increasing, driven not only by the trend in 
organisations for more virtual ways of working but also because of the political 
considerations characterised by recent terrorist threats. A Gartner Group surveyii 
spanning 30 countries highlights that this is a global issue and results ranked 
‘security as the number-one technology priority for 2005.’ The view from the 
financial industry reinforces the increasing importance of electronic security and 
statistics from Celent Researchiii, Boston estimate that IT security spending by 
North American banks will reach $1.8 billion in 2005, a 12.2% increase over 
2004.  
 
There is growing recognition, including at board level, of the importance of 
information security and technical warning and protection services are readily 
available, yet there remain urgent barriers to effective security practise. 
Addressing the latest cyber threat involves swift response from across the 
industry and that may only start following the sharing of experiences.  
 
People have a variety of perspectives on this aspect of the security role. While 
some advocate sharing (for example stating that it is “necessary for the greater 
good”), others hold more cynical views (for example stating that it “is more 
trouble than it is worth!’”). Given that there are sound and rational reasons to 
share cyber-security information, this diversity of views implies that this is more 
than just a rational decision.  
 
2.0 The response  
 
Collaboration between security professionals involves a delicate balancing act 
always addressing the need to protect their organisation’s proprietary interests. 
Investment in solid legal and contracting frameworks can form a valuable 
foundation but there is more to ensuring a mutually profitable sharing 
environment.  
 
Many highlight the need to trust another sufficiently to share as fundamental to 
the mutual success of cyber security across industries. Recognising this NISCC 
commissioned an initial study into the social-psychological factors influencing the 
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sharing of cyber threat information. This was in partnership with the post 
graduate research programme at Birkbeck College, UCL, London. The ultimate  
goal is to provide guidance to those who facilitate forums. Such guidance would  
focus on how to develop an environment were people are both motivated and 
able to share. This was to include and also to go beyond the role of trust in order 
to consider the factors influencing the actual decision to share.  
 
Detailed one-to-one interviews were conducted with volunteers, each person 
carefully selected so that the results covered as many different views and 
perspectives as possible. Existing forum members and facilitators were 
interviewed from public and private sectors, as well as the UK and US. In 
addition, academic, industry consultant, potential future forum members and 
executive managers of security leads were included in the breadth of inputs.  
 
The volunteers explored their thinking around the decision to share (or disclose) 
sensitive information about a security incident or vulnerability. Interviews were 
spread over the last year. Each was transcribed and then coded and analysed to 
identify concepts and factors. As findings emerged they were compared and 
contrasted with published research from the field of workplace/business 
psychology in order to ensure insights where grounded with best practise 
thinking and to shape the questioning for the subsequent interviews.  
 
3.0 The results  
 
Back in the early 1970s psychologistsiv suggested that the action of ‘disclosure’, 
aka sharing sensitive information, was determined by an individual’s personality. 
The influences are more complex and situational factors play an important role 
and that is good news for sharing within security forums. However, the challenge 
is to develop that environment and the associated social expectations in order to 
facilitate valuable and timely sharing between members.  
 
At the turn of the century business psychologistsv took a more sophisticated look 
at disclosure. This included focusing on disclosure as an interpersonal behaviour 
(something that happens, over time, between two or more people) and 
recognised that the behaviour is normally discretionary. Why do people engage 
in discretionary actions? There are many factors, for example, some think that 
women where more likely to share than men; there is some evidence for this 
generallyvi but this was not found to be evident in workplace situationsvii.  
 
During the joint NISCC and UCL study several key areas emerged. Not 
surprisingly, how people were motivated and what motivated them were 
fundamental but so too were the decision-making and actual sharing strategies. 
The interviews revealed that security professionals had very sophisticated 
thinking around the decision to disclose and subsequent analysis developed 
categories of factors involved in that thinking. Ideally, to enable an open and 
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sharing forum, these conditions should be nurtured by those leading and 
facilitating the community.  
 
Beyond these categories, the study identified key insights:  
 • Firstly, that it was the expectation of success or negative consequences 
that influenced, rather than the actual reality. These expectations were 
dynamic and were built through personal experience and also the 
reputations of others.  
 • Secondly, people were able to consider, at the same time, assessments 
of the likelihood of both positive and negative outcomes yet negative 
outcomes ‘loomed large’ in their perspectives.  
 • Thirdly, assessment of trustworthiness in another was crucial, but could 
be developed in a number of ways.  
 • Fourthly, personal ability and empowerment, along with having clear 
strategies for communicating and controlling the extent of any disclosure, 
are necessary to mitigate the risk of negative outcomes.  
 • Finally, the current ‘frame of mind’ of an individual tended to alter how 
they combined these factors when reaching their decision to disclose or 
withhold information.  
 
Details of the development of trust, the abilities and the conditions for the 
different ‘frames of mind’ developed during the study. This report details these 
findings in turn and proposes implications for the facilitation of such sharing 
forums:  
 
3.1 Developing Trust: 
  
Those interviewed had a high awareness of need for trust between parties. A 
number of different types of trust were reported. The first is Deterrence-Based 
trustviii which is that you can trust someone to do as they say they will as they 
‘fear’ a punishment. Legal frameworks can provide this sort of trust but for this 
situation it was not enough. Still needed but not sufficient; other sorts of trust 
were also required.  
 
Next is Calculus-Basedix where the motivation is to obtain rewards. In some 
cases the rewards of reciprocal sharing might be at some indeterminate point in 
the future - so again this is not enough.  
 
Knowledge-Based trust, (which is about ‘knowing’ another person well enough 
to predict their behaviour) was reported as the most suitable type of trust. It is 
likely to develop over time, through interacting with the person. It is the personal 
relationship that has the weight, not an organisational role, so consistency of 
membership is necessary. Interestingly, whereas this trust normally requires 
meeting and spending time with people, in the interviews it seemed more 
important to have seen how they handle themselves in difficult situations, not 
only in holding on to secrets but also behaving ethically to others who have 
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secrets and who might be more naive. This sort of trust requires an investment of 
time, however once established it is more tolerant of slight changes in behaviour,  
because this behaviour is put down to the situation a person was in rather than 
being a flaw in the person themselvesx.  
 
During the interviews expectations about the integrity of other security 
professionals were high and this can provide a limited degree of Identification-
Based trust. This is when you “identify with the other’s desire and intentions” to 
the extent that they can act as your proxy. One useful type of trust development 
mentioned was when a well-respected peer was able to introduce and 
recommend another person. This would then provide an initial level of trust. This 
was a form of Pre-emptive or Referential Basedxi trust which could be used 
selectively in the development of a sharing forum.  
 
3.2 Abilities & strategies 
  
Trust is an attribute of a relationship and, for sharing information, trust needs to 
be expressed through action. Even once trust is in place, the expression of trust 
is mediated by role autonomy (the discretion that people have in interpreting and 
enacting their roles)xii. The behaviour of any person is constrained by the position 
they hold within an organisationxiii. Autonomy of security professionals was 
reported to be critical.  
 
Clearly the holder of information needs to be empowered to share. However, 
empowerment is also important for the recipient of information. For shared 
information to be fruitful requires empowerment in two domains - empowerment 
from the forum, to make use of what has been shared, but also to be empowered 
back in the work place, or home organisation, to make changes or investments in 
response to that information.  
 
It was recognised that information has value to the recipient as well as a risk to 
the sharer so ways to maintain the value while reducing the risk are necessary 
but can provide a paradox. Anonymising information might defend the sharing 
organisation but it also reduces the weight or authority of the information to any 
recipients. As defending against a potential violation might require the investment 
of significant resources, the credibility of sources is important. Partial 
anonymisation, and/or the brokering of information via mutually trusted 3rd parties 
were considered useful techniques.  
 
Interviewees viewed information as a commodity, which has a value as part of an 
exchange. While they where motivated to share as part of identification with the 
forum goals and defending the nation’s critical infrastructure, they also report 
their expectation that they, in return, will receive some information of value. They 
did recognise that the timing of any return might be considerable. Interviewees 
were highly aware that there might always be a certain amount of information 
that they would never be prepared to share.  
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However this was only true at a macro level. When looking at what was shared, 
moment to moment (at the micro level) on the details of a particular incident, a 
highly controlled process was expected where each party gradually revealed  
information. An analogy was used with a game of poker in that there is an aim to 
minimise exposure yet to maximise gain.  
 
3.3 The influencing ‘Frames of Mind’  
 
Part of the analysis of the interview transcripts allowed a theory to be proposed 
as to how the interviewees combined these different factors to make their overall 
decision. Different people had different beliefs about sharing even though they 
were aware of the same factors. While each person has beliefs and expectations 
about how hard and how successful and how risky sharing might be the decision 
process seems to be more than just adding the various factors together.  
 
Some bias or weighting of the factors appeared to be part of the process. Each of 
us has many roles, each with particular responsibilities. Psychologists call these 
our Social Identitiesxiv. The Social identity that was the forefront of their mind 
seemed to be influencing the decision process. If a person is currently thinking 
about their job they appear to find the risks and the potential barriers clear in the 
focus of their mind, while the benefits would recede into the backgroundxv . If they 
are thinking in the context of the need for a professional sharing forum in support 
of a well-defended critical infrastructure then they are more likely to consider 
benefits and the value of the work.  
 
This theory does not imply that the ‘frame of mind’ would leave the individual 
blind to any factors, but merely that they would experience some factors as 
‘looming large’ in their thinking. The result is a shift in the balance of the 
motivation to share, and the expectation of their ability to do so, leading to a 
successful outcome without personal or organisational harm. 
 
4.0 The next steps  
 
The next step is to apply this understanding to active sharing forums and to test 
out the proposed theories. NISCC is considering the implications of the outputs 
of this study. If you would like to be involved please do email the NISCC contact 
on Sharing@niscc.gov.uk. In addition, NISCC along with ETR
2
A (www.etr2a.org) 
and Messenger Associates are exploring projects to develop the understanding 
of the role of trust between government and industry as an enabler for the 
sharing of cyber threat information. Mandy Messenger conducted this research 
study and is keen to support the development of sharing cultures within the cyber 
security industry. If you would like to know more she can be contacted on 
mandy@messengerassociates.co.uk.  
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